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1. INTRODUCTION
Mandatory pension schemes have recently been a focus of debate for both politicians and aca-
demics (cf. Commission to Strengthen Social Security (2001), Shiller (2003a)). Primarily, probably
because of the magnitude of the necessary changes in the di¤erent existing schemes; in order to rectify
previously too much generosity to older generations, either in the form of too small contributions or
too large benets; relative to the realisation of the assumptions on which these systems were based;
which has created an increasing legacy cost for future generations; but also because of the availability
of new cost e¤ective techniques for managing individual accounts; and not the least, because of some
important new insights into the risk management of large societal risks, (cf. Shiller (2003a)). It is to
this last reason for attention into mandatory pensions, to which this paper is oriented.
Shiller (2003b) argues that:the time when we redesign social security ought to be the time when we
carefully consider the fundamental intergenerational risk-management problem and dene choices in
individual accounts. The inter-generational risk-management problem, can simplistically be thought
of as: how to transfer the risks and the benets between two groups of agents young and old; where
the rst group disproportionately have human capital and benets from labour productivity; whereas
the other is primarily a beneciary of owning real capital and receives return from securities, either
directly through private savings or indirectly, via mandatory pensions. Albeit, individual accounts
are important as a vehicle for creating the appropriate incentives, by connecting contributions with
benets; individual accounts, are also motivated by the need to tailor exposure and diversify risks
that originate from individual di¤erences; in age, wage uncertainty, implicit insurances, preferences,
and assets that the individual may have; cf. Viceira (2001), who shows that even young individuals
may optimally have a lower proportion of risky assets than retireés.
When reforming their pension systems, some countries have introduced a notional or non-funded
dened contribution system (NDC); with individual accounts, and return indexed to wage growth.
This has the benet to the retireés of giving them a share of future labour productivity, while distri-
buting the volatility in wages to the entire society. The problem with this type of indexation is that
it exacerbates the wage-related risk for the younger generation who are already exposed to too much
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of this risk in their human capital.
Risk-sharing can be benecial for the society in its entirety, Campbell and Nosbusch (2006) found
that inter-generational risk-sharing decreased the risk premium. Campbell (2005) discusses a risk-
sharing system, where contributions are negatively correlated with capital returns, which e¤ectively
creates a swap- contract between real and human capital. Shiller have in numerous articles (cf.
Shiller (1993), Shiller (2003a)) advocated the introduction of a swap that pays the domestic aggregate
labour income growth in exchange for risk-free or a global labour income growth.
In this paper we propose an NDC system, which allow the individual some freedom of choice
in the allocation of the mandatory savings, while keeping the system for contributions intact. We
do this by introducing a swap-contract; where the individual, can choose to enter into a swap, that
swaps aggregate labour income growth in exchange for equity return (henceforth a Shiller-swap),
and thereby addressing the inter-generational risk-management problem. Net positions within the
NDC system couldportfolio be zero, leaving assets and liabilities in the system unchanged. Allowing
the individual to enter into specic positions of the Shiller-swap, would assuage the consequences of
forcing all individuals into one-size-ts-all, in terms of risk and returns characteristics of some of their
pension assets. To demonstrate the properties of our proposal, we use a model similar to the life-cycle
model of Campbell et al, (2001), (henceforth CCGM).
Life-cycle models have been used as a tool for explaining the accumulation and distribution of
wealth as well as portfolio choice over the life-cycle. For agents with uncertain income and liqui-
dity constraints, savings serve several purposes, e.g. precautionary, retirement and bequest. The
importance of each of these motives varies over the life-cycle and will consequently a¤ect both the
consumption and portfolio-choice. Over the life-cycle, retirement-savings will typically dominate in
absolute size and are to a large extent accumulated in mandatory pension schemes.
In a life-cycle model; the complete market solution, should be to equalise consumption over life
throughout an individualslife while keeping the residual savings in assets (including human capital)
optimally diversied. However, adding the constraint of inability to capitalise future income; young
individuals will attribute little value to their mandatory pension-savings; since they also face a positive
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earnings prole, (cf. CCGM, Carlsson and Erlandzon (2005)). Furthermore, young adults will also
have a disproportionate exposure to human capital; which is the rationale for our proposal, to use the
mandatory savings account in order to create a more balanced portfolio.
Not surprisingly, the largest welfare gains would be achieved by allowing the individual to freely
determine, when to save and how to allocate the savings. However, we cannot expect the market,
to solve this problem. The fact that most societies require a system with mandatory savings for pen-
sions among consenting adults, and that such systems have existed in many countries for more than
a century; is maybe a tribute to the intuition of past politicians into option theory and behavioral
nance modern societies will not permit people to consume too much of their income, and then allow
the same individuals to rely on society to care for their pension. The individual preferences and per-
ceived insurances that made it necessary for society to introduce the restriction of mandatory savings,
will most likely, also reduce the likelihood of these individuals making spontaneously good choices
among various investment alternatives. Government has therefore a rôle to play as an administrator
of mandatory pensions, but the design of such systems, should minimize the distortions.
We use the Swedish NDC system as a benchmark against which to measure the potential of
our proposal. Sweden was the rst country to introduce an NDC system, where contributions are
credited to an individual notional account with a return set to aggregate labour income growth. This
reform initiated 1999; has attracted a lot of interest as a potential blueprint for other countries (cf.
Schieber & Shoven (1996); Diamond (2002), Holzmann & Palmer (2006)). Furthermore, the relative
simplicity and transparency of both the tax and pension systems also facilitates a realistically cali-
brated model. Finally, Sweden has a unique availability of high-quality register-based data, which
alleviates some of the quality problems that would be associated with survey data. While calibrated
on Swedish data and rules for taxes and pensions, there are several similarities to systems in other
countries, e.g. Italy and xxxxx.
This paper has its origin in the literature that highlights uncertainty and market incompleteness as
important factors in explaining individual choice and welfare. The rst papers on this subject came
from the consumption literature on bu¤er-stock saving (cf. Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) and
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Friedman (1957)) and portfolio choice (cf. Samuelson (1969) and Merton (1971)). Deaton (1991),
Carroll (1997) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002) created life-cycle models with uncertain wages and
borrowing constraints. Cocco et al. (2005) and others extended these models with a portfolio choice
between a risk-free and a risky asset. In order to analyse the effects of di¤erent pension systems,
CCGM added a mandatory pension scheme to the model. They demonstrated a positive welfare e¤ect
from a lower pension contribution; due to a postponement of savings until a time when labour incomes
are higher. Carlsson and Erlandzon (2005), showed that the wage-indexation of mandatory savings,
exacerbothbates the negative welfare e¤ects, especially early in life.
Our model extends the CCGM-model both by including realistically calibrated tax- and pension-
systems and by an additional choice; i.e. we allow the individual to swap some of the aggregate income
exposure within the mandatory pension system for equity-risk and -return. The main contribution
of this paper is that: we can identify the age, when the individual would be a buyer or seller of
a Shiller-swap and estimate the required risk premium to attract both buyers and sellers. We nd
that the young would be buyers and then sellers when older and that this pattern is invariant to
individual risk-aversion. Therefore, the objective of societal risk-sharing can be achieved by allowing
the individuals to take positions in Shiller-swaps.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the model, while Section 3
demonstrates how the model is calibrated. The results are presented in Section 4. Finally, we end
with some concluding remarks in Section 5.
2. THE MODEL
2.1. Individual preferences
The individual maximises the expected utility over the adult life-cycle, which is divided into pre-
and post-retirement. "Optimization", starts at the age2 of 0(20), retires at a xed age K(65); and
dies at a maximum age of T (100). We assume that the individual has constant relative risk aversion
preferences, on a single non-durable consumption good, C .
2Or at the age of 23, for those with a university degree.
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Individual preferences at time m are dened as
C1 m
1   + Em
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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 2Y
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pj
1Ap 1C1 
1   + b(1  p 1)
D1 
1  

; (2.1)
where C represent consumption at age  ;  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, p is the one
year age contingent survival probability,  is the discount factor, b is the bequest parameter and D
is the bequest amount.
2.2. Labour income
The labour income process follows Carroll and Samwick (1997). During working life, the individual
experiences idiosyncratic as well as common shocks to gross income. The log labour real income lik
prior to retirement, for an individual i belonging to group k is exogenous; i.e. the individual cannot
change her labour supply or education to e.g. accomodate income shocks, and given as
lik = fk( ;Zik ) + vik + ik ; (2.2)
where fk is a function of the individual characteristics3 Zik as well as an average national labour
productivity growth l, ik is an idiosyncratic temporary shock distributed as N(0; "k) and vik is
a random walk
vik = vik 1 + uik : (2.3)
The innovation, uik ; is divided into a group aggregate k  N(0; k); which we allow to be correlated
with excess returns in the risky asset, and an individual uncorrelated component !ik  N(0; !k) as
uik = k + !ik : (2.4)
3 i.e. age, martial status, family size, number and age of children.
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2.3. Present mandatory savings and retirement benets
Mandatory pension-savings and retirement benets are part of an NDC-system in which 16% of
gross pre-retirement income4 is contributed by the employer and accounted for in individual accounts.
Contributions are capped above an income of 300 KSEK5 . The return on the accounts Rl is set
equal to the national labour income growth, (cf. RFV (2002)).
Rl = e
l+A ; (2.5)
NDCi =
8>><>>:
Rl 1 NDCi 1 + 0:16min [Li ; 300] ;  < 65
Rl 1 NDCi 1   PO (Rl 1 NDCi 1) ;   65;
(2.6)
where PO is the age specic annualised mortality-adjusted payout-function after retirement, and
l is the expected national labour income growth aggregated over all groups with noise, A 
N(  122A ; A):
Most individuals also have a negotiated supplementary pension, in which the employer compensates
for the cap on NDC contributions, by contributing to dened benet plan. The benets are constant
in real terms and is guaranteed for the remainder of life depend on the wage at retirement6 : These
company dened benet plans have a payout of 10%, 65% and 32:5% of incomes in the intervals
[0; 320), [320; 850), and [850; 1270) respectively at retirement.
Payout from this plan during retirement will be denoted DBPOi ; and its dynamics is
DBPOi = 0:1min

LPi64; 320

+
0:65min

max
 
LPi64   320; 0

; 850  320+
0:325min

max
 
LPi64   850; 0

; 1270  850 ;
(2.7)
with
4An additional contribution of 2:5%, can be managed by the individual in a funded account, for simplicity, we
disregard this here.
5 In the following, KSEK - thousands of Swedish Kronor will be omitted. The present exchange rate is circa 7 SEK
/ USD.
6 In reality it depends on the wage during the ve years prior to retirement. However, modelling this rule correctly
would have necessitated additional state variables. We therefore approximate this by only including the permanent
income changes until retirement.
7
LPi64 = e
fk(;Zik64)+vik64 : (2.8)
All payouts from the NDC pension plan are forfeited in the event of death and for simplicity, we
assume the same for the dened benet plan.
2.4. Taxes
Wage and retirement income Li can be dened as
Li =
8>><>>:
eli ;  < 65
PO (R
l
 1 NDCi 1) +DBPOi ;   65:
(2.9)
According to current Swedish tax rules, labour income and pension benet are taxed at the same
rate, and separate from capital income7 . To calculate net income Lni ; we rst deduct a general
allowance of 10; then a municipal tax of 30%, a government tax of 20% on all income above 300 and
nally an additional government tax of 5% on income above 450. Net income is bounded below at
60 by the social welfare minimum-benet, which also applies to retirees in the form of a government-
guaranteed minimum pension.
Lni = max[Li   0:3max (Li   10; 0) 
0:2max (Li   300; 0)  0:05max(Li   450; 0); 60]:
(2.10)
All the threshold-values that create kinks in tax-rates and benets8 are indexed to the expected
national labour income growth l, except the social welfare minimum benet which is kept constant
in real terms.
7We use the tax rules for incomes earned in 2003.
8This is the same as in the US since the "bend points" when calculating the primary insurance amount (PIA) are
adjusted by average earnings growth.
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2.5. Assets
There is one risky and one risk-free asset with after-tax real log-returns equal to re and r
f respec-
tively. Excess return is dened as
re   rf = e +  ; (2.11)
where the noise , is correlated with the group aggregate innovation in permanent labour income
k, which allows for a group specic sensitivity to the risky asset,
2664 

3775  N
0BB@
2664   122
  122
3775 ;
2664  
0 
2

3775
1CCA : (2.12)
2.6. Private savings and consumption
Each individual starts her optimization lifewith initial wealth set to z. In pre-retirement years
the individual receives a wage, and in subsequent years the individual will receive retirement benets.
The individual have two control variables: the proportion of cash on hand to consume  ; and what
proportion of savings  ; to allocate to the risky asset. The cash on hand, or disposable wealth, is
therefore,
Xi =
8>><>>:
er
f 
1 + i 1(e
e+   1) [1  i 1]Xi 1 + Lni ;  > 0
zi + Lni ;  = 0
(2.13)
of which consumption is,
Ci = iXi : (2.14)
There is also constraints for both borrowing and short-sales,
0  i  1;
0  i  1:
(2.15)
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2.7. Mandatory savings with Shiller-swaps
With our proposal, the agent can exchange (buy the contract) the risk and return in their NDC
account for equity exposure, through a Shiller-swap. The design of this contract is as follows: rst, we
dene the premium s, to the seller of the contract; in such a way, that if a Shiller-bond existed, with
log-return (l+A +s); (equal to labour income growth plus premium) it would be a non-redundant
asset; i.e., attracting an unrestricted (international) investor with power utility, i.e.
l + s = rf  
2
A
2 + (
e +
2
2 );
where  = Cov(;
A)
V ar() :
(2.16)
We then create a zero-investment portfolio,
E
h
er
f
(e
e+ +   1)  el+A +s
i
= 0; (2.17)
which determines the exchange multiple ; the ratio by which returns are swapped in a Shiller-
swap. The reason for this construct is that; we are only interested in the demand for Shiller-swaps
due to the di¤erent risk characteristics and not because of di¤erences in expected return,
The individual can now choose ; the proportion of their NDC account they wish to swap.
Consequently the overall return on the NDC account (Equation (2.5)) changes to
Rl = e
l+A + 
h
er
f
(e
e+ +   1)  el+A +s
i
: (2.18)
2.8. Optimization
The optimization problem therefore has four state-variables ( , v, X and NDC) and three choice-
variables (;  and ); as well as four stochastic variables (, u, A and ). The value function of the
individual intertemporal consumption and investment problem can then be written as
V (  ) = max
 ;  ; 

C1 
1  + E

pV+1 ( +1) + (1  p ) bD
1 
+1
1 

  = fX ; v ; NDCg :
(2.19)
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The solution to this problem determines the state-dependent policy-rules
 = k (  );
 = k (  );
 = k (  ):
(2.20)
We solve the problem numerically by backward recursion from the nal year T , using by-now
standard methods, cf. Cocco et al. (2005) and Judd (1998).
3. CALIBRATION OF PARAMETERS
3.1. Estimation of labour income process
We model individuals rather than households. Our rationale is primarily that: pension contri-
butions and benets are based on individual rather than family incomes; taxes are progressive and
only dependent on the individual instead of family incomes. In addition to wages, labour income
was dened to include all taxable social benets, primarily compensation for unemployment, sick-
ness and early retirement. Data was calculated from the LINDA data set for the years 1992 to
2002. LINDA a register-based longitudinal data set, which consists of a large panel of individu-
als, which is representative for the population from 1960 and onwards. The data set covers 3.35%
of the Swedish population (more then 300,000 individuals plus their household members) and is de-
scribed in Edin and Fredriksson (2000) and has recently received attention cf. Calvet et al (2006),
Campbell (2006) and Flood (2003).
The data was divided into six non-intersecting groups dened by educational attainment and
sex. The predictable component of labour income was estimated separately for each group and the
regressors include dummy variables for marital status and age as well as the number of children in
four age-intervals. Table A.1 presents some parameter estimates for the most numerous group Men
with High-school9
[skriv ngt mer]
9The results from the other groups are similar, and income in this group was closest to the national average. A more
detailed description of the methodology and parameter estimates can be found in Carlsson and Erlandzon (2005).
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3.2. Individual parameters
For the reference case we used a standard set of assumptions regarding, the individual parameters.
First, we set the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion  to 5 and the discount factor  to 0.98,and
the bequest parameter b is set to 1, making consumption and bequest equally important in the nal
year. The survival probabilities p are sex dependent and taken from the Swedish life insurers when
underwriting new policies, i.e. they are forward looking.
3.3. Assets and correlations
We set the risk-free aftertax rate rf to 1:5%, consistent with the present gross return of less than
2% for long-dated index-linked bonds. The mean after tax equity premium e is set to 3%, which is
low when compared with the historical average, but corresponds well with forward-looking estimates
Claus and Thomas (2001); Fama and French (2002)). Volatility  was set to 17% for the risky asset.
Following Cocco et al. (2005), we then estimated the correlation %k between group-specic per-
manent labour income shocks k and lagged equity returns  1.to estimate (cf. Table A.1). To
keep the value of the NDC account within "reasonable" limits, we arbitrarily restricted the equity
exposure from the Shiller-swap to 20% of the account. We also set the growth in average labour
income l to 1:8%, the estimate used by the Swedish National Social Insurance Board. Finally, initial
wealth z was set to 47, the mean wealth for individuals between the ages of 20 and 23.
4. RESULTS
To study the potential outcomes generated by the model; we simulated individual behaviour from
age 20, by generating 30,000 random trajectories through time. Subject to the stochastic experience,
the individual will choose a response, dened by the policy functions in Equation (2.20) (shares of
consumption, risky assets and Shiller swaps), that describe the optimal state dependent behaviour.
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4.1. International pricing of Shiller-swaps
As a reference, we plot the averages of the simulated trajectories for cash on hand (Figure A.9),
risky weight (Figure A.8) and consumption (Figure A.7) for two scenarios; with and without the
existence of an internationally priced Shiller-swap. Since the swap was priced as a zero-investment,
we do not expect these proles to be more than marginally di¤erent. However, the risk exposure of the
NDC account is completely changed. In the Figure A.6, we plot the prole for the average size of the
NDC account together with the hedged amount of aggregate wage risk for an internationally priced
swap. Prior to mid-life the agent is constrained by our arbitrary rule of a maximum equity exposure
in the NDC account of 20%. Before retirement, the individual hedge not only the NDC account,
but also the discounted expected value of both the dened benet contract and future wages. When
the dened benet pension is xed at retirement and future wages are zero, the agent still continues
to hedge the discounted expected value of the NDC account.
4.2. Inter-generational pricing of Shiller-swaps
To investigate the potential demand for Shiller-swaps from domestic investors only trading with
their NDC accounts as collateral, we increased the swap premium s (Equation (2.16)) with 10; 15
and 25bp (basis points) respectively, in addition to what an international investor requires. Figure A.3
(Shiller-swap share) and Figure A.10 (Shiller amount NDCi ) shows the simulated proles, but
now for the equity exposure that stems from the Shiller-swap. The additional premium will encourage
the agent to be both a buyer and seller of such a swap, but at di¤erent ages. Before retirement, the
individual will on average be a buyer of the Shiller-swap and afterwards a seller; thereby creating
a voluntary inter-generational transfer of wage-growth risk. Selling the contract implies a negative
equity exposure in the NDC account, that is partly compensated for by a higher risky share  in
private savings (cf. Figure A.1)
[Insert g A.3, A.10 and A.1 here]
The higher risky share does not fully compensate for the negative equity-exposure in the NDC
account, as is demonstrated in Figure A.2, which shows total equity exposure from both private
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savings and the NDC account. In early life, the agent tries to maximise the equity exposure (subject
to our constraint of 20%), irrespective of the premium. Later in life and as private savings increase,
the increased swap-premium make the agent more inclined to sell the Shiller-swap.
For the single agent belonging to this group and with these preferences (risk aversion); the 15bp
additional swap premium would approximately "clear" the demand and supply across the individuals
age; increasing the premium further would create excess supply. We can therefore expect that
if overall demand and supply is una¤ected by individual di¤erences in risk-aversion a Shiller-swap
market could be established within the NDC framework without resorting to an international market.
Changing the relative risk aversion from 5 to 2 or to 10 has only a minor e¤ect on preference for Shiller-
swap exposure (cf. Figure A.5), whereas the same changes in risk aversion have a dramatic impact
on the risky weight (cf. Figure A.4).
[Insert g A.5 and A.4 here]
As long as individuals are risk-averse, and with the expected risk premium s and multiple ;
set so that the Shiller-swap has zero expected return ( cf. Equation (2.17)), there will still be demand
for the Shiller-swap, but for hedging perspective; whereas the demand for risky assets are primarily
motivated by higher expected returns.
5. CONCLUSION AND COMMENTS
In a life-cycle model of a borrowing-constrained individualsconsumption- and portfolio-choice in
the presence of uncertain labour income and realistically calibrated tax and pension systems where
the pension scheme consists of both a dened benet and notionally dened contribution parts, the
latter indexed to stochastic aggregate labour income growth. The introduction of a Shiller-swap to
mandatory individual pension accounts would allow individuals to benecially swap wage- and equity-
risk.
Although such a market has not yet been established, an increase in the premium of only 15bp
would create domestic demand and supply for this swap, by individuals at di¤erent ages. It would
therefore be possible to create such a market among individuals within the pension system, thereby
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allowing a voluntary inter-generational sharing of wage-risk.
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APPENDIX A: TABLES AND FIGURES
TABLE A.1
Variance decomposition and estimated return covariances
Number of Estimated Estimated Std. Correlations
individuals variance of variance of of the permanent with Swedish
the permanent the transitory aggregate equity returns,
Group component, 2uk component, 
2
"k
component; k %k
Full sample 55 532 .01989 .482
Men 31540
Compulsory 6878 .00462 .00867 .02008 .517
school (.000137) (.000379)
High school 14978 .00564 .00981 .02020 .514
(gymnasium) (.000112) (.000313)
University 9684 .00958 .01208 .02187 .539
degree (.000226) (.000625)
Women 23992
Compulsory 3485 .00403 .00623 .02014 .477
school (.000140) (.000386)
High school 11119 .00460 .00741 .01943 .444
(gymnasium) (.000085) (.000235)
University 9388 .00634 .01000 .02269 .290
degree (.000126) (.000348)
Standard errors in parentheses
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FIG. A.1 Risky weights of cash on hand  with di¤erent Shiller-swap premia in addition to the
international requirement s.
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FIG. A.2 Total exposure to risky assets from private savings and the NDC account.
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FIG. A.3 Shiller-swap weights  with di¤erent swap premia in addition to the international
requirement s.
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FIG. A.4 Shiller-swap weights  when swap premium is set for international investors, but with
di¤erent constant relative risk aversions(CRRA) .
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FIG. A.5 Risky weights when swap premium s is set for international investors, but with di¤erent
constant relative risk aversions(CRRA) .
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FIG. A.6 Hedged wage exposure NDC and value of NDC account, when the swap premium is
set for international investors.
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FIG. A.7 Consumption C; patterns when swap premium is set for international investors and
without Shiller-swaps.
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FIG. A.8 Risky weight  when swap premium is set for international investors and without Shiller-
swaps.
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FIG. A.9 Cash on hand X, patterns when swap premium is set for international investors and
wihout Shiller-swaps.
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FIG. A.10 Amount of equity exposure through Shiller-swap NDC ; with di¤erent swap premia.
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